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NOTES ON BORROWING AND CONVERGENCE 
Robert L. Tsai
∗
 & Nelson Tebbe** 
Response to: Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal 
Borrowing and Convergence, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 670 (2011). 
INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional borrowing is not always practiced in a way that is 
consistent with constitutional commitments or rule of law values. Critics may 
be troubled when courts use doctrine in one area of law to legitimize a move in 
another area that they consider objectionable. They might also have structural 
concerns if the law is reshaped over time through the cumulative effects of 
borrowing. 
In a fascinating new Essay, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal 
Borrowing and Convergence, Professor Jennifer Laurin provides a case study 
in what she sees as borrowing’s drawbacks. It is a terrific example of just the 
sort of cross-doctrinal research for which we have tried to provide a theoretical 
framework.1 Laurin’s main argument is that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 
holding in Herring v. United States—namely that the exclusionary rule did not 
apply to a violation of the Fourth Amendment that followed from police 
negligence—can be best understood by placing the decision in the context of 
the Court’s ongoing practice of lifting ideas from constitutional tort doctrine.2 
Even though the Herring Court did not say so—a silence that she finds 
troubling—it actually drew on that other area of law, particularly the idea that 
“good faith” or “objectively reasonable” police action would not necessarily be 
remedied.3 
∗ Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law.
**   Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. We thank Miriam Baer and Richard Bierschbach for
exceedingly helpful comments.
1. Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 459
(2010). 
2. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 670, 672–73 (2011) [hereinafter Laurin, Trawling]. 
3. Even more recently, the Court has reaffirmed the idea that “objectively reasonable”
police action cannot be deterred by, and therefore is not subject to, the exclusionary rule. Davis v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 
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Her Essay offers a plausible account of the Court’s efforts to import 
elements from constitutional tort law into Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
especially to delimit the exclusionary remedy. Laurin shows how scattered 
references to ideas of “causation,” “good faith,” and “fault,” drawn from the 
law of section 1983, became increasingly systematic. She also demonstrates 
that the overlap of these two bodies of law has yielded an uncomfortable fusion 
of two different remedial schemes in a way that has limited the range of 
possible remedies for illegal searches. Most damning, she contends that 
borrowing has led to the “functional diminishment of the constitutional 
standard.”4 Laurin’s method beautifully reveals the microdynamics of judging 
without losing sight of the broader political and cultural resources from which 
jurists draw to fashion persuasive opinions. 
Beyond recounting what happened to the exclusionary remedy, the Essay 
aims to advance scholarly understanding of the dynamics of borrowing. Laurin 
compares her rather pessimistic depiction of the practice to our own, which 
defends the general custom of borrowing in terms of its benefits for the rule of 
law.5 She concludes that her account “offers a rare look at the darker side” of 
borrowing, which has the power to “undermine a remedial regime.”6 
In this Response, we will raise three questions about her critique of 
constitutional borrowing. First, does her opposition to the Court’s acts of 
strategic borrowing in the exclusionary rule cases call into question the 
attractiveness of borrowing itself as a judicial practice, or does it instead target 
a particular species of political reconstruction? Another possibility is that her 
discontent centers on the appropriateness of this particular crossover, perhaps 
because of a poor fit between the two doctrines, or perhaps because the 
Herring Court did not acknowledge its debt to another body of law. 
Second, we investigate a phenomenon that Laurin calls “convergence.”7 
In brief, she thinks that over time it is possible for two legal domains to 
“merg[e] . . . into one”8 so that they become “functionally indistinguishable,”9 
if not formally melded. The idea seems to be that, when this happens, it is no 
longer possible to speak meaningfully of borrowing, because the source and 
target doctrines are now operationally indistinct. The sharing can even occur 
almost unconsciously.10 Although this is a valuable insight, we wonder 
whether it is the only way to describe what has happened in the Herring line of 
cases, or whether it is also possible to tell a story in which key ideas migrated 
over into exclusionary rule jurisprudence, where they became more or less 
independent of the source domain—if similarly influenced by a deterrence 
framework. This alternative explanation suggests a less dire account, where, 
despite some habitual permeability, developments in one area of law influence 
(1984)). 
4. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 741.
5. Id. at 672.
6. Id. at 676, 677; cf. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 1, at 482 (addressing “dark[] motivations”
that may drive a particular instance of borrowing). 
7. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 674.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 711.
10. Id. at 724.
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outcomes elsewhere in a less constrained way. 
Third and finally, we are intrigued by Laurin’s depiction of how political 
motivations can influence borrowing. On this point, it may be helpful to 
distinguish between internal and external dynamics that may be implicated by 
borrowing. The first is mostly associated with administrative concerns, while 
the second involves structural forces. We encourage her to develop her theory 
of the role of politics in borrowing.  
I. SPECIFIC CRITIQUE OR GENERAL?
Constitutional borrowing as a general practice can and should be 
evaluated in a way that is distinct from how we assess any particular type or 
instance of it. Whether an act of borrowing ought to be embraced is a question 
that is related to the broader issue of whether the general practice is defensible, 
but it is not the same thing—a specific importation can be opposed without 
denying, on balance, the attractiveness of this pervasive common law 
technique.11 A firm distinction between the specific and the general allows 
space for fine-grained critique of particular moves, while subjecting structural 
critiques to distinct evaluation. In her Essay, Laurin critiques a pathway of 
borrowing in the Herring line of cases that has become attractive to judges, 
and we find her concerns interesting and persuasive. Sometimes, however, she 
crosses over into assessment of the general practice that raises intriguing 
questions for our project. We will address her specific and general critiques in 
turn. 
Laurin worries that the interplay between criminal procedure and 
constitutional tort that culminated in Herring has worked more harm than 
good. Her main concerns line up with criteria that we have offered for 
evaluating particular instances of borrowing, including especially: fit (are the 
two areas of law sufficiently similar?), transparency (has the court been 
forthright about its reliance on another area?), and yield (has the borrowing 
generated anything useful for maintaining a legal order?).12 In fact, several of 
her arguments about Herring could serve as examples—compelling ones—of 
just the types of failures that we anticipated. 
First, fit: Laurin objects that the principles and practical considerations 
driving the exclusionary rule are distinct from those that underlie remedial 
doctrine in constitutional tort.13 One difference, related to the obvious divide 
between criminal and civil law, is that tort law focuses on individualized 
wrongdoing, whereas the exclusionary rule, like other criminal remedies, looks 
11. Id. at 673 (“[T]he very structure of a common law tradition dictates that, particularly
where novel legal issues are raised, borrowing will be a frequent feature of judicial reasoning.”). 
While recognizing borrowing’s pervasiveness, our article attempted to describe and analyze its 
dynamics in constitutional law, showing for instance how it interacts with five theories of 
constitutional interpretation. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 1, at 511–22. 
12. For this reason, we evaluated the practice in a section of our initial study that was
different from the part where we offered criteria for assessing any particular instance of 
borrowing. Compare Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 1, at 484–94 (offering a defense of borrowing 
generally), with id. at 494–511 (offering criteria for judging particular borrowings).  
13. Cf. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 703–04 (discussing “fit” as general criterion for
analogical reasoning in law). 
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also to correct any institutional defects that can habitually lead to constitutional 
violations.14 The Herring Court embraced an approach that focused on 
individual deterrence and a particular officer’s culpability—whether the officer 
had engaged in “gross negligence” and therefore deserved “punishment”—
rather than on systematic defects in law enforcement administration that might 
need to be addressed.15 Although she sometimes characterizes the consonance 
between the two doctrines as adequate or minimally sufficient,16 we read her 
to be attacking the substantive suitability of the two areas. 
Second, transparency: Part of what bothers Laurin about the turnabout in 
Herring is that the Court nowhere actually cited—let alone justified its reliance 
on—its constitutional tort precedents. Extending previous cases that tightened 
the connection between criminal law and civil law cases concerning Fourth 
Amendment violations, the Herring Court simply lifted the culpability 
framework without acknowledging its source. “Occlud[ing]” that move made it 
harder to uncover, assess, and resist future acts of borrowing.17 That sort of 
masking, Laurin rightly says, “disserves important rule of law values.”18 We 
have argued similarly that covert acts of appropriation can naturalize contested 
linkages between constitutional domains in a way that can insulate them from 
critique, especially by nonspecialists.19 While signposting is not always 
necessary or attractive, its absence can actually threaten the very values of 
accountability and accessibility that borrowing can otherwise promote. 
Third, yield: Building on her earlier pathbreaking work on remedial 
rationing and distribution,20 Laurin points out that the effect of harmonizing 
the two doctrines will be a kind of “doubling-down.”21 She means that when 
the Court weakens constitutional remedies in one area, there is an automatic 
enervating effect on the other. Fans of the exclusionary rule therefore have 
extra reason for concern in the contemporary judicial environment. Moreover, 
the doubling-down effect might concern even neutral observers who think that 
it is desirable to afford citizens a diverse mix of remedial regimes, whether to 
reduce judicial error costs or to encourage experimentation. 
All of this makes good sense from our perspective. At times, though, 
Laurin goes further and critiques the practice of borrowing itself. After noting 
our general defense of constitutional borrowing, she says that her analysis of 
Herring provides “a less sanguine account of borrowing” than that of 
14. Id. at 673.
15. Id. at 730–31 (discussing “fit” explicitly).
16. Id. at 674.
17. Id. at 743 (noting “the potential of convergence to occlude its very operation”).
18. Id.
19. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 1, at 503–04.
20. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Rodriguez v. City of Houston,
and Remedial Rationing, 109 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 82, 83–85 (2009) [hereinafter Laurin, 
Remedial Rationing], http://columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/109/82_Laurin.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing remedial rationing underestimates limitations of 
criminal and civil litigation to achieve regulatory goals); Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation 
and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1002, 
1022–29 (2010) [hereinafter Laurin, Rights Translation] (discussing fault-based considerations in 
criminal procedure). 
21. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 676, 741.
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“previous commentators.”22 But does it? Or is the moral of her compelling 
story instead that any particular instance of the practice can go awry along 
dimensions of fit, transparency, and yield? After all, Laurin provides just one 
example—albeit an important one—of the sort of migration that happens all 
the time in constitutional law, and in law generally.23 Of course such crossover 
will sometimes happen in unsavory ways—it undoubtedly has a “dark side,” to 
use Laurin’s language.24 But any conclusion that the practice on the whole is 
normatively undesirable requires a more systematic treatment. 
Even if we limit ourselves to Laurin’s case study, and put to one side any 
larger evaluation, it is interesting to ask whether Laurin’s deepest objection is 
really to the crossover between criminal procedure and tort law itself. Is it truly 
the correspondence between these two areas that troubles her, or is it the 
substance of how the Court has eviscerated Fourth Amendment remedial 
schemes in both? At times, she does seem to critique the borrowing itself, 
independent of what it is being used to accomplish, especially insofar as she 
questions its fit and transparency.25 But at other times, she gives the 
impression that her chief complaint is with underenforcement of criminal and 
civil sanctions for Fourth Amendment violations.26 Would she be troubled if 
borrowing were used in much the same way except that it served to bolster, 
rather than undermine, the exclusionary rule in tandem with civil penalties for 
illegal searches? If the poor fit and occlusion persisted, then her critique would 
still have bite, but it is interesting to consider whether she would still find it 
worth making. In any event, our main point here is that Laurin’s account may 
not undermine the actual practice of constitutional borrowing as much as it 
might appear. 
II. BORROWING VS. CONVERGENCE
Key to Laurin’s more pessimistic account is her idea of “convergence”—
an advanced form of iterated migration. As she points out, borrowing spawns 
further borrowing.27  Once a connection has been drawn between two areas of 
law, it is available to be endorsed or expanded by subsequent courts. Judges 
may follow the lead of others for interpretive guidance, out of habit, for added 
legitimacy, or due to a stronger strategic motivation. Over time, commonalities 
can be emphasized or enhanced to the extent that areas of law become 
22. Id. at 742.
23. See, e.g., Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 1, at 469 (describing borrowing between First
Amendment and Fourth Amendment); id. at 472 (between substantive due process and dormant 
commerce clause); id. at 473 (between First Amendment speech cases and Second Amendment); 
id. at 479 (between equal protection and free exercise). 
24. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 676; see, e.g., Tebbe & Tsai, supranote 1, at 482
(addressing “darker set of motivations that can, in extreme situations, infect an act of 
borrowing”). 
25. See, e.g., Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 703–04 (discussing fit).
26. See, e.g., id. at 732 (bemoaning fact that convergence of these two particular fields will
work as “one-way ratchet” that works to limit, and not expand, constitutional remedies). 
27. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 675 (“Convergence then deepens those ties and begets
further borrowing.”); Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 1, at 488 (“Borrowing begets further 
borrowing.”).  
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meaningfully paired in the eyes of lawyers and judges. 
Convergence happens when two areas of law “merge[] . . . into one,”28 or 
“become one” so that they are “functionally indistinguishable.”29 For Laurin, 
convergence is conceptually distinct from borrowing, even though the two 
phenomena are “intertwined.”30 We can imagine two ways in which 
convergence could stand as a distinct phenomenon, and therefore two ways 
that identifying the category could generate independent conceptual yield. 
One distinguishing characteristic of convergence is that once two areas 
have merged, courts no longer flag any sharing, and the crossover becomes 
customary or naturalized. Judges may intentionally promote this process to 
effectuate a transformation. Or they might blur boundaries in a manner that is 
not fully conscious.31 Either way, transparency then becomes an ongoing 
problem to a degree that it is not for ordinary borrowing. So in Herring itself, 
the Court may have felt no need to signal that it was deploying tort doctrine to 
bolster its deterrence-based interpretation of criminal procedure rules. Some 
evidence to this effect is that the Herring dissent, strong as it was, did not think 
to protest against the infection of ideas like the primacy of individual police 
culpability—on the ground, say, of poor fit.32 Possibly, the dissent calculated 
that the costs of resistance had become higher than the possibility of 
successfully changing the trajectory of the law. Or perhaps the crossover had 
become so habitual that it went unnoticed. 
Another possible meaning of “convergence” is that after a merger has 
become successful, it no longer makes sense to speak of “borrowing” because 
the two areas have become practically indistinguishable. When that happens, 
there is little independent development of either area of law. Examples of this 
are hard to come by, but they are possible to imagine. One might be the 
unification of law and equity.33 Another may be the law of speech and 
assembly where a protest or demonstration is involved. 
None of this is to deny the utility of the concept of convergence. Overall, 
it is a helpful addition to the theoretical structure that we have been working to 
elaborate. It has particular value because it emerges from a convincing real-
world case study of an interplay between two remedial regimes. Moreover, the 
28. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 674. The full passage reads:
These areas exemplify not only an increasing permeability of the barrier between the
separate remedial realms of criminal and civil Fourth Amendment enforcement, but also
the merging, functionally if not formally, of two previously independent remedial paths 
into one. This dynamic is distinct in its operation and effect from the initial act of
borrowing. It is instead best characterized as convergence.
Id. 
29. Id. at 711.
30. Id. at 674.
31. See id. at 724 (“Convergence may be knowingly pursued . . . . But it may also be a 
phenomenon that is observable only in retrospect . . . . Moreover, convergence may accelerate in 
an almost unconscious manner.”). 
32. On the other hand, borrowing itself can also be subtle. Laurin notes, for example, that in
Leon, the most important precursor to Herring, not even the explicit borrowing from 
constitutional tort cases drew objection from Justice Brennan’s otherwise vociferous dissent. Id. 
at 704. 
33. That convergence, however, was less doctrinal than institutional and jurisdictional.
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concept of convergence has potential explanatory power, because it directs 
attention to systematic problems of transparency and accountability. 
Our question here is whether the relationship between criminal procedure 
and constitutional tort has developed to the point that the doctrines—or even 
just the remedial regimes—can be said to have merged “into one.”34 Without a 
doubt, the pathway between them is well worn; that much Laurin conclusively 
establishes. But it is less clear to us that the overlap has become sufficiently 
broad or deep that it goes unnoticed, works below the level of consciousness, is 
assumed by both sides of the debate, makes it meaningless to speak of 
borrowing, or plays an outsized causal role in the development of exclusionary 
rule doctrine. 
Admittedly, the debt that the Herring Court owed to constitutional tort 
law may not have been obvious to ordinary citizens, and for that reason among 
others we sympathize with Laurin’s protest.35 Still, it might be just as possible 
to tell a story in which the Court’s focus on individual deterrence and the 
culpability of particular officers, rather than on systemic deterrence of 
carelessness in police departments, began to influence criminal procedure over 
the course of several cases, perhaps legitimated by reference to tort doctrine, 
and now has achieved some autonomous role there, without strongly erasing 
distinctions between the two remedial regimes. If that story is true, what 
happened in Herring might not have even been principally attributable to 
borrowing, much less to convergence, since ideas like individual deterrence 
and culpability had already become native to criminal procedure.36 
To circle back to Laurin’s more general concerns about the practice of 
borrowing, note the possible implications of overlap. A synthesis of two 
domains of knowledge on a point of law does not destroy judicial discretion. 
Nor does merger mean that developments in one body of law will necessarily 
drive developments in another. It remains possible after Her ing there may be 
cases in which section 1983 concepts are not always used or are significantly 
reinterpreted. 
Consider, too, that the exclusionary rule has long drawn widespread ire of 
a sort that has not been directed at civil remedies for constitutional 
violations.37 For many constitutional actors outside the judicial arena, 
including certain politicians and their constituents, there is something deeply 
troubling about the prospect of allowing a guilty criminal to go free because of 
a police officer’s constitutional violations—different from seeing a civil 
litigant go uncompensated after the same unconstitutional act. That gap in 
34. Cf. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 674 (describing “merging, functionally if not
formally, of two previously independent remedial paths into one”). At times, Laurin uses the 
concept of convergence more narrowly, such as when she argues that the good faith exception in 
criminal procedure and the good faith defense in section 1983 had merged in earlier cases. Id. at 
710–11. This usage raises fewer questions for us. 
35. See supra Part I.
36. Laurin at one point acknowledges something like this possibility. Laurin, Trawling,
supra note 2, at 722–23 (noting it is difficult to “causally attribute” doctrinal shifts to borrowing 
or convergence after initial migration has taken hold). 
37. See id. at 674 (noting civil law remedial scheme had advantage of being “politically 
acceptable by Justices who spanned the Court’s ideological spectrum”). 
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public salience brings up another potentially distinct type of borrowing that 
Laurin’s perceptive discussion suggests without naming—the exchange of 
constitutional ideas between jurists and constitutional actors outside the court 
system, particularly in politics. It is to that sort of exchange that we now turn. 
III. THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL IN BORROWING
Every so often, Laurin acknowledges the external forces that may be 
contributing to convergence. She observes that Republicans actively 
campaigned against the exclusionary rule and that officials in the Reagan 
administration proposed just the sort of borrowing she identified so as to limit 
the reach of the remedy.38 
We encourage Laurin to mine this vein and develop her theory of how the 
external and internal features of convergence interact. Many different types of 
processes may be at work—some at the macro level (historical, electoral, 
sociological, institutional) and some at the micro level (the rationales and 
forms available for borrowing, more individualistic considerations that might 
impact the exercise of judicial discretion, and so on). Laurin talks about 
convergence in terms of “hydraulics” and the “tendency to generate a cascade 
of pressure on doctrinal barriers.”39 In these moments, she suggests that 
convergence is exclusively, or at least mostly, an internal process. By contrast, 
one of us has described convergence as a phenomenon in which judges 
purposively reshape formative external events and mobilized patterns of 
thought and discourse.40 
Whether or not Laurin agrees with this formulation, the reasons for 
undertaking convergence may be largely internal or external in a particular 
case. The internal include considerations such as bringing greater cohesiveness 
to a set of legal ideas, making an area of law easier to administer for judges, or 
reviving dormant but useful concepts. Each of these reasons, in one way or 
another, rests on the idea that the legitimacy of law depends on its internal 
integrity. Blurring doctrinal and linguistic boundaries can aid this concern. But 
let us suppose that there can occasionally be some external reasons for 
convergence as well: shaping the law to better reflect certain political or 
cultural attitudes; sending messages to certain nonjudicial constituencies, 
bureaucratic actors, or the public at large; or aligning judicial priorities with 
those of another branch of government (current or past). Suddenly, we might 
need a richer account of convergence to explain what is being converged and 
why. 
So what is really driving jurists to reference section 1983, or in Laurin’s 
words, to pick up the “accessible hammer?” A way of thinking about the 
dynamics of convergence is to imagine two types of jurists who might be 
tempted to engage in constitutional borrowing: one who is ideologically 
motivated and another who is not (or at least not on a given issue). The second 
38. Id. at 694.
39. Id. at 710.
40. Robert L. Tsai, Eloquence and Reason: Creating a First Amendment Culture 78–162
(2008); Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in Presidential Leadership, 86 Wash. 
U. L. Rev. 363 (2008).
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judge is more interested in administration; the first is committed to political 
reconstruction. At this point, a distinction can be drawn between 
“administrative” borrowing, which entails more technical merging of doctrine, 
and “reconstructive” borrowing, which bridges legal discourses and political or 
cultural forces. Now, in reality, judges fall along some continuum of 
philosophical inclinations. Nevertheless, the reasons why the two jurists lay 
plans for convergence may differ. The ideologically committed jurist may wish 
to be tough on crime, or reverse the Warren Court revolution, or please 
political patrons. Alternatively, a judge may simply feel that law enforcement 
officers have for too long had their decisions second-guessed. 
Once in a while, Laurin seems to want to tell just this sort of story about 
political reconstruction of the law.41 For instance, she mentions Reagan’s 
election and Attorney General William French Smith’s desire to utilize the 
“good faith” principle as a way of limiting the exclusionary rule.42 But this 
observation is not closely connected to a strong account of why judges are 
borrowing the idea. Most of the time, Laurin appears content with letting the 
pieces of the borrowing puzzle be the central figures in her story of 
constitutional development, rather than zooming out to view the more general 
picture under construction. Crime control is just the kind of high-salience issue 
on which there is likely to be more stringent vetting, and therefore greater 
congruence between electoral priorities and juridic outcomes is to be 
expected.43 Nixon picked Warren Burger, a published critic of the 
exclusionary rule,44 to help reverse perceived Warren Court excesses, 
especially in the area of crime control. Burger was later joined by Reagan’s 
appointees in such cases as United States v. Leon. And is it any surprise that 
Herring was written by John Roberts, who worked for Smith as a young 
Justice Department lawyer?45 Even with a story of political reconstruction, 
there can be variations. It may be that Burger and Roberts happened to find 
useful precedents to work out their conservative leanings. Or, if a stronger 
variation is preferred, each Chief Justice, in his own time, saw himself as 
completing the project begun so many years ago to return the law to the side of 
victims rather than perpetrators. 
There are all sorts of intriguing questions raised by Laurin’s article on this 
front. How much of the exchange of ideas between politics and law occurred 
passively, or at least on the level of background culture, with conservative 
41. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 694–97.
42. Id. at 694.
43. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: 
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 759 
(1995); Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How the 
New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 Geo. L.J. 
1385 (2006); Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh 
Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 933 (2010); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 
2030 (2000); Keith E. Whittington, The Burger Court: Once More in Transition, in The United 
States Supreme Court: The Pursuit of Justice 300 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005). 
44. Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1964).
45. Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships
from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1149, 1225–31 (2010). 
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jurists and politicians inhabiting the same spheres of life?How much can be 
attributed to network effects, so that the judicial codification of politically 
charged ideas is more consciously coordinated through events, workshops, 
campaigns, and organizations? And how much is happening through litigation 
or the electoral process? 
All of this brings us back, finally, to the central issue: how to evaluate 
whether a series of borrowings is good, neutral, or just plain awful. Laurin is 
generally critical of the Supreme Court’s efforts to draw from the law of 
section 1983 to flesh out the contours of the exclusionary rule. At various 
points, she points out that convergence has encouraged an attitude hat civil 
damages and the exclusionary rule should be mutually exclusive rem di s. 
Still, has Laurin succeeded in showing that politically minded borrowing itself 
is normatively undesirable or does her analysis do more to show that the High 
Court’s borrowing in this context, in the way it has been accomplished, is 
troubling? 
We think that whether borrowing is normatively desirable depends on 
commitments having little to do with borrowing itself but the ways in which 
something is appropriated. In terms of administrative concerns, it is possible 
Laurin might have understated some of the efficiency gains from convergence. 
One might have thought that in the realm of criminal procedure—unlike other 
areas of the law—greater streamlining may be warranted to best calibrate the 
incentives for effective policing. Whether this kind of criminal law 
exceptionalism is a great idea or not (we have reservations about tking his 
line of thinking too far), the Court has certainly made this point repeatedly.46 
Having done so, it might have seen reasons for wishing to streamline the ways 
in which Fourth Amendment violations are addressed across civil and criminal 
contexts. Or perhaps, if one takes the position that democratic legitimacy and 
accountability matter most, then convergence of the law with newfound 
political priorities may have been needed to balance the judge-cent red vision 
of the Warren Court. This would point the way toward an external defense of 
convergence. 
We believe that Laurin’s story might illustrate a different type of 
borrowing, rather than a necessary corruption of judicial decisionmaking—
something closer to political reconstruction than to administrat ve migration. 
Under some normative conceptions of the legal order (say, one grounded in 
popular constitutionalism), reconstructive migration of ideas may be more 
inevitable and less troubling as a systematic matter than is sometimes feared, 
even though we might agree with Laurin on the substance of the 
transformation that is occurring in the particular context of the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule. After all, winners in the political process 
often do get to set the terms of legal debate, including in the courts. 
An important contribution of her study is its demonstration of how 
 
46. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (denying defense 
request for discovery from prosecutors after deferring to “special province” of executive branch); 
McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (“Because discretion is essential to the criminal 
justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the 
discretion has been abused.”). 
150 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR Vol. 111:140 
borrowing can matter to legal decisionmaking, even when judges are drawing 
on more overtly political resources for constitutional adjudication. In contexts 
where borrowing is pushing in a certain ideological direction—say, against the 
exclusionary rule—administrative borrowing still may supply Justices with 
doctrinal mechanisms to effectuate their independent policy preferenc s.47 In 
other words, the reasons for undertaking convergence may be largely technical. 
Internal borrowing is not necessarily epiphenomenal, even for a tribunal as 
politically sensitive and involved as the Supreme Court. Instead, judges may 
resort to it at least in part because they recognize that they must demonstrate 
some minimal fit between—to use Laurin’s excellent example—a campaign to 
curtail the exclusionary rule and existing doctrinal tools. That borrowing can 
and does matter in this way bolsters our impression that the practice has 
important benefits for the rule of law, and for negotiating he line between law 
and politics.  
CONCLUSION 
Laurin has presented an incisive account of the evolution of the 
exclusionary remedy, one that ought to be read carefully by anyone concerned 
with civil rights or criminal procedure. Ultimately, whether it is better to have 
multiple, alternative remedies, or a legal scheme that narrows and treamlines 
the range of remedies, strikes us as a question that turns on questions of 
fairness, deterrence, and justice. What Laurin accomplishes in Trawling for 
Herring is a powerful reminder that constitutional borrowing can have real 
consequences, not all of which are always welcome. It reinforces th 
importance of transparency, especially where the incongruities between th  
domains of legal knowledge are significant. To satisfy rule of law standards, 
the tradeoffs entailed in a major act of borrowing should ordina ily not be 




Preferred Citation:  Robert L. Tsai & Nelson Tebbe, Notes on Borrowing and 




47. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 2, at 674. 
